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Abstract
The study aims to capture links between the use of encrypted communication channel -
Telegram and lone wolf attacks occurred in Europe between 2015-2016. To understand
threads of ISIS communication on Telegram we used digital ethnography approach which
consists of the self-observation of information flows on four of ISIS’s most celebrated
telegram Channels. We draw on public sphere theory and coined the term terror socio-sphere
3.0 as the theoretical background of this study. The collected data is presented as screenshots
to capture a visual evidence of ISIS communication threads. This study shows that ISIS
Telegram channels play critical role in personal communication between potential recruits
and dissemination of propaganda that encourage ‘lone wolves’ to carry attacks in the world at
large. This study was limited to the number of the channels that have been widely celebrated.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/
vol10/iss3/3
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Introduction 
Between February 2015 and August 2016, lone wolf terrorists subjected 
Europe to a series of attacks by lone wolf terrorists pledging their 
allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Nice, Brussels, and 
Cologne alone suffered over 400 casualties caused by lone wolf attacks. 
According to the Global Terrorism Index, the phenomenon of lone wolf 
attacks in Europe and North America intensified after the rise of the ISIS.1 
Calls for individuals to carry out lone wolf attacks were spread online 
through a sophisticated information operations strategy adopted by ISIS 
with the self-professed goal of striking back at coalition forces. 
Communication technologies such as social media platforms (Facebook), 
anonymous sharing portals (Justpaste.it), cloud computing (Google drive), 
and encrypted communication applications (Telegram) were the backbone 
of ISIS’s modus-operandi. Importantly, the use of mobile end-to-end 
encrypted applications such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram has 
contributed to the emergence of a new paradigm of terror communication-
an online terror-sphere. As Seamus Hughes and Alexander Meleagrou-
Hitchens argue, “the emergence of applications such as Telegram, 
SureSpot, Kik, and–since its recent offering of end-to-end encryption–
WhatsApp has been a particular game changer for the Islamic State and its 
efforts in the West.2 The wide adoption of newly introduced ‘end-end’ 
encryption communication technologies have allowed ISIS, as well as 
other groups, to establish and successfully leverage a secure medium of 
communication.   
 
The social media service Telegram, largely due to its native support of 
encrypted one-to-one and one-to-many communication, has been widely 
adopted by ISIS and its affiliates globally. This article aims to examine the 
role played by Telegram in ISIS’ strategy of encouraging lone wolf attacks 
targeting Western countries. Launched in 2013 by the Durov brothers, 
who were also the developers behind the Russian social network 
VKontakte, Telegram has arguably popularized the use of end-to-end 
encryption in social media messengers. In 2015, the Telegram platform 
introduced public channels, thus enabling one-to-many communication in 
parallel with its core one-to-one functionality. Telegram channels enabled 
ISIS members and affiliates to establish their own media platforms with 
                                                          
1 Global Terrorism Index. “Measuring and Understanding the Impact of 
Terrorism Institution for Economics and Peace,” available at: 
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/04/Global-Terrorism-Index-
Report-2014.pdf. 
2 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Seamus Hughes, “The Threat to the United 
States from the Islamic State’s Virtual Entrepreneurs,” CTC Sentinel10, no. 3 
(March 2017), available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-threat-to-the-united-
states-from-the-islamic-states-virtual-entrepreneurs. 
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numerous followers, enabling users to receive one-to-many messages 
while also communicating individually across encrypted connections. ISIS 
members and affiliates created hundreds of channels, using the Telegram 
service to generate content, personalize encrypted one-to-one 
communications, and control the logistics of dissemination of sensitive 
information and propaganda.  
 
Information broadcasted over Telegram channels can be instantly shared 
across multiple digital platforms and vice versa. The significance of ISIS’ 
use of the platform lies in the ability to establish multi-purpose channels 
strengthening its propaganda machine. Crucially, this allows ISIS 
affiliates, only latently connected to the central hubs of the organization, to 
receive and share a coherent centralized propaganda message as well as 
establish encrypted communication channels with each other. Such 
channels therefore act as systems of coordination, message reinforcement, 
and activity planning.  
 
The objective of this article is to start conceptualizing the relationships 
between the emergence of Telegram and its role in the surge of lone wolf 
attacks in the West. The article focuses on the dynamics of ISIS’ 
information operation in order to recognize different themes 
characterizing its use of the platform as a catalyst of terrorist mobilization. 
Following a brief discussion of the methodology of the argument, the 
article discusses the notion of a terror socio-sphere, and concludes with 
preliminary findings. 
 
Methodology 
The study is based on an approach informed by digital ethnography, 
involving the first author of this article joining as an observer in public 
Telegram channels operated by ISIS members/affiliates. Identifying 
publicly available ISIS channels on Telegram was not a hard task, as ISIS 
maintains a designated public channel called Nashir (disseminator, in 
Arabic). ISIS affiliates on Twitter share the broadcasting role of the 
channel and re-broadcasting links to content originating from Nashir. In 
line with its broadcasting function, this channel operates in a number of 
languages such as Arabic, English, Turkish and Spanish, and recommends 
trusted ISIS channels for its members to follow. One of the important 
considerations when encountering such channels is their authenticity as 
legitimate ISIS-operated content distribution nodes. The author adopted a 
practical rule-of-thumb approach in establishing the authenticity of 
channels, by focusing on the themes prevalent in the content and 
messages shared across them. For example, it is highly probable that any 
channel spreading hate towards the West, sharing ISIS propaganda, and 
encouraging attacks against Western targets is a trusted ISIS channel. An 
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important metric that can be used as a filter of authenticity is the peer-to-
peer filtering performed by ISIS channels themselves. Such channels will 
vet and share information from other trusted channels operated by ISIS 
affiliates, thereby leveraging a sort of distributed crowd-filtering network 
to achieve a snowballing effect in terms of information dissemination.     
 
The study mirrored this process with a snowballing approach involving the 
first author joining 70 ISIS-affiliated Telegram channels. To collect the 
data from these channels, the first author established his own channel on 
Telegram named “Data collection”. The collected data includes all shared 
content such as images and graphics, as well as videos encouraging 
individuals to attack Western interests (attack potential infrastructure 
networks such as airports, water supplies, and electricity grids) and the 
killing of military or police personnel. The information shared across these 
channels also includes instructional content aimed at potential lone wolf 
attackers, digital logistics advice aimed at channel members (opening a 
Twitter account using a hacked phone number), instructions for making 
small bombs and explosives, and, most importantly, instructions for lone 
wolves on leaving media traces such as videos or notes pledging alliance to 
ISIS.  
 
For the purposes of this article, we have focused on three types of content: 
(1) information that is aimed at lone wolves, encourages attacks, and 
includes instructions and methods of attacks, (2) information aiming to 
inspire other potential lone wolves to carry attacks, and (3) information 
celebrating acts of terror and claiming responsibility. Data was gathered 
from the Telegram channels in the form of screenshots. Screenshots “as 
media objects…can be dynamically traced across the networks of their 
dissemination and require a re-evaluation of the axioms of cultural 
production that considers texts independently of experience.”3 
Furthermore, screenshots play an important role in making sense of data 
visualization, as well as mapping and graphing the research method. For 
the purpose of this study, the analysis sought to answer two important 
ontological and epistemological questions: (1) what do these data 
represent and (2) what claims can be made from them? 
 
Terror Socio-Sphere  
Since its emergence, ISIS has rapidly adapted cutting-edge 
communication technologies to attain its information operation objectives. 
In many ways, this process resembled the way popular social movements 
                                                          
3 Christopher Moore, “Screenshots as Virtual Photography: Cybernetics, 
Remediation, and Affect,” in Advancing digital humanities: research, methods, 
theories, eds. Katherine Bode and Paul Longley Arthur (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), available at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1954/. 
Shehabat et al.: Encrypted Jihad
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
30 
across the Arab world leveraged social media platforms as a catalyst for 
political mobilization during the ‘Arab Spring’.  
 
Arguably, the important role of social media networks during the events of 
the Arab Spring uprisings precipitated the shift to a new communication 
paradigm in the Arab world, a phenomenon that has been termed the 
emergence of “new Arab public sphere.”4 According to Marc Lynch, the 
new Arab public sphere emerged because of “a generation that has gained 
the platforms and the mechanisms to engage in sustained arguments, 
debate [sic] and discussions about their common concerns.”5 By contrast, 
as either military personnel or coercive secular or theocratic regimes rule 
most Arab countries, freedom of speech, personal liberty, and political 
debate are highly restricted. Most Arab regimes are non-democratic, and 
any call for grassroots political mobilization condemning political power is 
persecuted. During the Arab Spring events, grassroots movements across 
the region were using social media to broadcast content calling for 
freedom, democracy, and social justice. In effect, the emergence of social 
media facilitated the participation of Arab publics in political debate and 
acted as a powerful catalyst for political mobilization.  
 
The debate over the role of digital platforms in the emergence of this new 
public sphere is connected to the work of Jürgen Habermas, who 
developed the concept of the public sphere to account for “a realm of our 
social life in which something approaching public opinion can be 
formed.”6 According to Habermas, the most important feature of the 
public sphere is its engagement of the public in a ‘rational-critical debate’, 
involving such fundamental liberal rights as freedom of opinion and 
speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly and association. 
Interpreting Habermas’ argument, David Krieger and Andréa Belliger 
coined the term socio-sphere, suggesting an abstract space that is “neither 
private nor public, but it is based upon the new form of communication 
made possibly by digital media, namely ‘many to many’ communication.”7 
They argued that the new socio-sphere enables and encourages 
participation in different ways regardless of traditional boundaries.  
 
The notion of a socio-sphere provides a useful framework within the 
context of this study, as it allows us to approach the role of Telegram in 
ISIS propaganda operations from a systemic network-focused perspective. 
                                                          
4 Marc Lynch, Voices of the new Arab public. Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East 
Politics Today (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).  
5 Marc Lynch, “Voices of Arab.” 
6 Habermas Juirgen, “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,” 
Cambridge: MIT Press 85 (1989): 85-92.  
7 David Krieger, and Andréa Belliger, Interpreting Networks: Hermeneutics, 
Actor-network Theory and New Media (Transcript Verlag, 2014). 
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In supporting one-to-many as well as one-to-one communications, 
Telegram has in effect transformed ISIS sympathizers and affiliates into 
distributed information aggregators and disseminators, able to act 
stigmergically without direct coordination and control. As Krieger and 
Belliger point out, socio-spheres allow participants to be network actors 
despite geographic boundaries. Arguably, the rise of encrypted social 
media apps has produced a new triadic paradigm-shift in communication, 
enabling the simultaneous performing of private-to-private, private-to-
public, and public-to-public communication. To situate Telegram in the 
emergence of a digital terror socio-sphere, it is important to understand 
how terror organizations have harnessed the platform and how Telegram 
has served their agendas. In addition, it is important to look at the 
topology and architecture of the platform, as well as the ways in which it 
has changed the dynamics of communication. Within this context, we 
think that the encrypted communication affordances provided by 
Telegram have contributed to the emergence of a public terror socio-
sphere. In particular, ISIS’ information operation on Telegram is centered 
on one-to-many, many-to-many, and one-to-one communication with far 
reaching ramifications.  
 
Zizi Papacharissi has argued that individuals can engage socially in a 
private media sphere situated within their personal and private spaces.8 
This private social interaction sphere is rhetorically established by 
utilizing existing and imagined geographical places.9 Encrypted 
communication apps such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and Signal act as such 
geographic spaces, in effect enabling a participatory terror socio-sphere of 
information flows. This is in distinct contrast to other public 
communication channels such as Twitter and Facebook. The 
private/public socio-spheres of terror are enacted as spaces for potential 
terrorists to share common grievances in, and have thus become unifying 
rhetoric loci for ISIS-related propaganda aimed at affiliates and 
sympathizers. For example, messages showing the brutality of coalition 
forces destroying homes and killing innocent people are constantly 
diffused across Telegram channels. This type of content serves as force 
multiplier, in that it acts to unify affiliates around a cause perceived as 
just, as well as inspire potential lone wolves to carry on attacks. 
Importantly, ISIS can map the significant increase of the number of 
attacks against Western interests in 2015-2016 to the rapid adoption of 
Telegram in 2015. It has been established that the perpetrators of a 
number of lone wolf attacks in this time used Telegram as their main 
                                                          
8 Zizi Papacharissi, A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2010). 
9 Papacharissi, “A Private Sphere.” 
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communication channel.10 Consequently, Telegram can represent 
perceived a threat to the security of the European continent and the 
United States of America (USA), insofar as it enables secure end-to-end 
communications across the new terror socio-sphere. Within this context, it 
is important to consider why ISIS shifted its information operation 
strategy away from popular social media networks and migrated to 
Telegram. 
 
Findings  
ISIS’s Digital Migration to Telegram  
Telegram promotes itself as an ultra-secure instant messaging system 
because all data is encrypted from start to finish, a process known in the 
industry as end-to-end encryption. Telegram has more than 100 million 
active subscribers. Most of those subscribers are from Middle East, 
Central and Southeast Asia, and Latin America.11 Telegram represents the 
main hub for ISIS’s communication.12   
 
While in this article the authors have made an attempt to examine the role 
of Telegram in lone wolf attacks, they set to examine the extent to which 
ISIS members and their affiliates are using Telegram to inspire potential 
lone wolves to carry attacks. The collected data obtained from ISIS’s 
Telegram channels suggested four main reasons behind ISIS’s digital 
migration to Telegram: (1) seeking encryption, (2) seeking a channel-
supporting platform, (3) enhancing ISIS’s digital infrastructure against 
cyber-attacks, and (4) decreasing exposure to hacktivism and other 
information warfare counter-measures.  
 
Seeking Encryption 
Prior to the emergence of ISIS, terror organizations such as al-Qaeda were 
keen to encrypt and secure their communications. In the past, Al-Qaeda 
coordinated terrorist activities in Europe using draft messages on shared 
email accounts or by sending encrypted files.13 
                                                          
10 Global Terrorism Index. “Measuring and Understanding.”  
11 Joseph Menn and Yeganeh Torbati, “Iran Hackers Reveal Identities of 15m 
Telegram Messaging Accounts,” Middle East Eye, August 16, 2016, available at: 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-hackers-accessed-15-million-
telegram-messaging-accounts-678104419. 
12 Mary-Ann Russon and Jason Murdock, “Welcome to the Bizarre and 
Frightening World of Islamic State channels on Telegram,” IB Times, June 2, 
2016, available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/welcome-bizarre-frightening-
world-islamic-state-channels-telegram-1561186. 
13 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, and Emilie Oftedal, “Jihadi Terrorism in 
Europe: The IS-Effect,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016), 3-24, 
available at: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/553.  
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Personal anonymity and secure chat are important capabilities driving 
ISIS to adopt the platform. Using Telegram has made obfuscating and 
protecting attacker identities from Western intelligence agencies much 
easier, since only few electronic clues are left in intercepted data sets.14 
While Telegram has been helpful to establish a socio-sphere and hide the 
identities of potential lone wolves, Nico Prucha has argued that anonymity 
and encryption have not benefited the strategic level of ISIS information 
operations.15 He argues that the “secrecy and encryption of Telegram is 
harmful for IS’ swarming operations as the networks which are sustained 
on Telegram lack the outreach as well as the opportunities for projecting 
influence, which Twitter in particular allowed”. In addition, unlike 
encrypted applications such as Signal, which has been endorsed by 
Edward Snowden, some encryption specialists question the quality of 
Telegram encryption, suggesting that the platform may have a backdoor. 
That said, Pavel Durov, the developer of Telegram, has consistently argued 
that the core of strength of Telegram is user anonymity, and has 
challenged encryption specialists to test Telegram’s protocols for exploits 
with a $100,000 USD reward.16 
 
Interestingly, ISIS did not adopt WhatsApp another popular encrypted 
communication application, because Facebook purchased it in 2013. 
Despite WhatsApp’s recent adoption of the same end-to-end encryption 
protocol as Signal, ISIS supporters are convinced it is not safe and is the 
easiest application to be hacked. Kavanaugh and Shiloach noticed that 
ISIS supporters who have long used other mainstream social media 
platforms, such as Twitter, have been increasingly joining Telegram. As 
stated above, this is because Telegram allows its users to send encrypted 
messages, providing an advantage to jihadists while making it more 
difficult for law enforcement to identify ISIS affiliates online.17  
 
                                                          
14 Sam Schechner and Benoit Faucon, “New Tricks Make ISIS, Once Easily 
Tracked, a Sophisticated Opponent,” The Wall Street Journal September 11, 
2016, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-tricks-make-isis-once-
easily-tracked-a-sophisticated-opponent-1473613106?mod=e2tw. 
15 Nico Prucha, “IS and the Jihadist Information Highway–Projecting Influence 
and Religious Identity via Telegram,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016), 
48-58, available at: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/556.  
16 Shane Dixon Kavanaugh and Gilad Shiloach, “ISIS Spreads Violence and Terror 
with ‘Foolproof’ App, Vocativ,” November 17, 2015, Available at: 
http://www.vocativ.com/251826/isis-followers-flock-to-a-new-foolproof-
messaging-app/. 
17 “ISIS Using Telegram App to Plot Attacks on US Bases in Middle East – Israeli 
hackers,” RT.com,  August 4, 2016, available at: 
https://www.rt.com/news/354589-isis-telegram-israeli-hack/. 
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Seeking a Channel-Supporting Platform 
As mentioned above, one of the most important Telegram features, 
unveiled in September 2015, is the creation of public and private channels 
on the platform. This new feature enables users to establish their own 
channels to share information with an unlimited number of anonymous 
subscribers. Islamic State of Iraq and Sham strategically harnesses this 
feature by swarming Telegram with a large number of private and public 
channels in multiple languages, therefore generating ad hoc networks 
ensuring its information operation objectives. For instance, in the 
aftermath of the Paris attacks, for which ISIS claimed responsibility, 
Telegram suspended 78 pro-ISIS telegram channels. Despite that, the 
Nashir channel mentioned above was re-launched in English, Russian, 
French, Turkish, and Somali to maintain network presence and target 
potential international subscribers. In November 2015, ISIS swarmed 
Telegram with hundreds of channels; each specialized in a specific type of 
content. The most popular ISIS channels on Telegram are Dabiq, Nashir, 
Amaq, and Gazwa. According to Berger and Perez, these channels “have 
been used as the initial point of distribution for propaganda releases. Once 
released on Telegram, links to the propaganda content are subsequently 
distributed on Twitter.”18 
 
Enhancing ISIS’s digital infrastructure against cyber-attacks  
In an effort to disrupt ISIS communications and other core functions, the 
US military’s Cyber Command announced the launch of its first attack 
against the organization’s digital infrastructure in August 2015, during 
President Barack Obama’s visit in Hanover.19 Google, Twitter, and 
Facebook responded to calls from US Cyber Command to help shut down 
accounts affiliated with ISIS, with Twitter suspending over 300,000 
accounts related to the organization. The degrading of ISIS’ Twitter 
affiliates network led many Western analysts to believe that ISIS in 
general was in decline.20 These coordinated network-degrading attacks 
pressured ISIS to shift some of its digital activities away from popular 
social media such as Twitter to other platforms such as Telegram, even 
though initially, as Berger and Perez argue, “these other platforms are 
                                                          
18 J. M. Berger and Heather Perez, The Islamic State's Diminishing Returns on 
Twitter: How Suspensions are limiting the Social Networks of English-speaking 
ISIS Supporters, (St. Louis, MO: George Washington University, 2016), 1-21, 
available at: 
https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Berger_Occasional
%20Paper.pdf.  
19 Wang Wei, “Pro-ISIS Hackers Release 'Kill List' of 43 United States Officials,” 
The Hackers News, April 26, 2016, available at: 
http://thehackernews.com/2016/04/isis-hacker.html. 
20 Prucha, “IS and the Jihadist,” 48-58.  
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used primarily as backups for Twitter.”21 While efforts have been made 
to severely degrade ISIS presence on Twitter and Facebook, governments 
have been finding it increasingly difficult to track and monitor 
communications on Telegram.22 Telegram’s functionality enables users to 
have one-to-one and group conversations that are end-to-end encrypted, 
and ISIS has taken full advantage of the platform's privacy benefits to 
establish a community of channels, bots, and secret chat rooms. As 
Kavanaugh and Shiloach point out, “even anonymous, which claims to 
have hacked or crippled thousands of ISIS Twitter accounts and online 
forums, has been ineffective on Telegram.”23 An ISIS member called Abu-
Osama Sinan Algazi has claimed that the network degrading operation has 
been largely unsuccessful, as “in this electronic war between the 
supporters and the Crusaders, lots of our brothers prefer Telegram over 
anything else.”24 
 
Unlike Facebook or Twitter, which are capable of regularly suspending 
accounts in a centralized manner, Telegram’s more distributed nature, 
coupled with end-to-end encryption, demands a collective user-led effort 
to report ISIS-affiliate channels to the Telegram admins.  
 
Decreasing exposure to hacktivism and other information warfare 
counter-measures  
In the context of US Cyber Command operations against the organization 
in 2015, hacktivist groups such as Anonymous and CtrlSec declared 
operation #IceISIS (Figure 1), aimed at hacking and disrupting ISIS’ 
online presence across a variety of blog hosting platforms, Twitter 
accounts, and mobile phone apps. Under the motto ‘ISIS we are going to 
kick you out of the Internet’, anonymous attacked affiliated ISIS websites 
such as “ummetislam.net” and took down the ‘glade of tiding’ mobile app, 
as well as thousands of ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts. These swarm-like 
attacks were successful, to the extent that they forced ISIS to migrate its 
network to Telegram, perceived as a safer platform of operations. 
 
                                                          
21 Berger and Perez., “The Islamic State's Diminishing Returns,” 1-21.  
22 Russon and Murdock, “Welcome to the Bizarre.” 
23 Kavanaugh and Shiloach, “ISIS Spreads Violence.”  
24 Prucha, “IS and the Jihadist,” 48-58. 
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Figure 1: OpIceISIS screenshot25. 
 
ISIS on Telegram  
The following three objectives outline clearly the strategic rationale behind 
ISIS’ use of Telegram by its Nashir channel in the following three 
objectives: (1) declaring electronic jihad, (2) waging media maneuver 
warfare, and (3) providing an online platform for the recruitment of lone 
wolves. 
 
Declaring electronic jihad 
The concept of “Electronic Jihad” was widely used by Al-Qaeda leaders 
such as Al-Zawahiri and Al-Awlaki to inspire and recruit potential 
members to Al-Qaeda. Al-Awlaki, for instance, used the concept “WWW 
Jihad for mobilizing prospective adherents and inciting terrorist 
actions.”26 In a similar vein, ISIS used the concept of e-jihad to encourage 
followers and affiliates to establish Telegram channels and Twitter 
accounts. Throughout our observation of ISIS’ Telegram channels we 
noticed a widespread conviction among the organization’s affiliates that 
opening channels on Telegram is considered partaking in Jihad.  
 
The concept of electronic jihad has been leveraged by ISIS to enroll 
numerous affiliates into a distributed network used to disseminate 
propaganda videos, organize financial support, issue warfare activity 
updates, reach out globally to potential recruits, and paint a 
propagandized utopian picture of daily life in the territories controlled by 
ISIS. Activities as simple as the dissemination of the ISIS weekly 
                                                          
25 Screenshot obtained from OpIceISIS Twitter account 
26 Martin Rudner, “Electronic Jihad: The Internet as Al Qaeda's Catalyst for 
Global Terror,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 1 (2017): 10-23, 
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157403. 
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multilingual magazines Dabiq and Rumyah, or the sharing of instructional 
materials focused on setting up encrypted communications and evading 
surveillance, or sharing updated safe channel lists, all count as electronic 
jihad.   
 
Waging media manoeuver warfare 
Periodically ISIS’ Telegram channels declare media manoeuver warfare, or 
in Arabic, Gazwa e’lamyah. In practice, media manoeuver warfare 
involves the mass re-opening of suspended social media accounts across 
multiple platforms, in conjunction with the creation of new accounts. This 
is viewed as maneuver warfare insofar as it is understood that the re-
established accounts will exist only temporarily, soon to be shut down by 
the host platforms, though long enough to achieve a pulse-like 
broadcasting of messages aimed at a broader global audience. The pulse 
messages could be like: “dear brother, don’t imprison yourself in Telegram 
channels only as most of your channel members are ISIS supporters, but 
break the chain and join channels of infidels and other social networks to 
upset your enemies. Strive to be amongst them in the networks they have 
created and be steadfast therein, patiently awaiting your reward.”27 In 
general, ISIS’s media manoeuver warfare aims to: 
 
• Identify and report anti-ISIS channels to be suspended. 
• Post and upload videos and materials on Facebook and 
YouTube. 
• Use currently trending hashtags to reach numerous audiences. 
• Tweet daily at peak times propagandizing purported atrocities 
committed by coalition forces. 
 
These messages are usually coordinated by ISIS affiliates calling 
themselves ‘The Media Mujahedeen’. Figure 2  shows an example of these 
messages, explaining the importance of media in wining the war against 
coalition forces. 
 
As stated clearly in Figure 2, the ISIS propaganda arm considers the media 
battle to be worth at least 75 percent of the overall victory. Framed in this 
way, ISIS supporters are considered to have direct responsibility to use 
media as a weapon. In addition, the message encourages followers to keep 
re-engaging with Twitter, considering it as the most important media field. 
In other words, ISIS believes winning the media war means winning the 
war against coalition forces. 
 
                                                          
27 As Cited in Nashir political service Telegram channel on 21 June 2016. 
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Figure 2: Message forwarded from the Nashir Telegram channel28. 
 
Online platform for the recruitment of lone wolves 
Part of ISIS’ stated information operation objectives is to spread a message 
of fear among the native populations of coalition forces, and to inspire 
Muslims to engage in lone wolf attacks striking at Western targets. 
According to Ramon Spaaij, lone wolf attacks are characterized by a 
person working individually, not belonging to an organized terrorist 
group, and not directed by an outside command or hierarchy.29 However, 
direct online ties between individuals carrying out attacks in the West and 
ISIS networks are hard to prove and are often uncertain, even though ISIS 
has claimed responsibility for most attacks occurring in the period 
between 2015 and 2016. Data gathered by Nesser, Stenersen, and Oftedal 
shows that “only 6 out of 23 single actors […] acted solely based on online 
inspiration.”30  
 
ISIS’ Telegram Channels 
On November 26, 2016, the ISIS media channel Furat released a video in 
French with Arabic subtitles, titled Sur leur pas, meaning on their way in 
Arabic. According to Nico Purcha, “the video is in the 16:9 format, full high 
definition, and features praise for the spate of ‘lone wolf’ attackers in 2016. 
The film demonstrates vividly how ISIS uses Telegram to instigate 
attacks.”31 Reviewing the role of encrypted communication platforms such 
as Telegram in catalyzing lone wolf attacks; our observations over the type 
of messages generated and disseminated via ISIS’ Telegram channels 
involve two main themes: (1) inspiring lone wolf attacks, and (2) claiming 
responsibility for, and celebrating acts of terror.  
                                                          
28 Screenshot obtained from Nashir political service on 3 May 2016 
29 Ramon Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism33, no. 9 (2010): 854-870.  
30 Nesser, Stenersen, and Oftedal, “Jihadi Terrorism,” 3-24. 
31 Prucha, “IS and the Jihadist,” 48-58. 
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Inspiring lone wolf attacks 
The term lone wolf was initially coined in the late 1990s by two white 
supremacists, Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis, as part of an effort to 
encourage other supremacists to act alone in committing violent crimes. 
Other terms that have been used to describe similar or comparable forms 
of political violence include “leaderless resistance” and “freelance 
terrorism.”32 According to the US Homeland Security Committee report 
(2016), ISIS “has successfully crowd-sourced its terrorism agenda by 
inspiring independent followers to conduct most of its attacks. Two-thirds 
of ISIS plots against the West appear to have been inspired by the terror 
outfit, rather than directed by it or carried out by trained jihadists.”33 This 
skill to franchise terror has decreased the cost of the group’s operations 
and increased the impact of its violence.  
 
As shown in Figure 3, the frequency of individual attacks occurring in the 
West increased markedly between July and August 2015, after ISIS called 
for lone wolves to carry on attacks. Significantly, lone wolves carried out 
two thirds of these attacks.  
 
According to the Homeland Security Committee report mentioned above, 
ISIS has been tied to at least 75 terrorist attacks against Western interests 
since early 2014.34 A list of ‘do it yourself jihad’ attacks against Western 
interests, compiled from ISIS’ Telegram channels, where ISIS claimed 
responsibility and/or the perpetrators pledged allegiance is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
                                                          
32 Gabriel Weimann, “Lone Wolves in Cyberspace,” Journal of Terrorism 
Research 3, no. 2 (2012), 75-90, available at: http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.405.  
33 Homeland Security Committee, “#Terror Gone Viral: Overview of the 75 Isis-
Linked Plots against the West 2014-2016 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2016), available at: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Report-Terror-Gone-Viral-1.pdf. 
34 Homeland Security Committee, “#Terror Gone Viral,” 1-15. 
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Figure 3: Infographic demonstrating ISIS’ links to lone wolf attacks.35   
 
 
Date Country City Weapon Causalities 
14/July/2015 France Nice Truck 80 killed 
 Germany Würzburg Axe 
/knife 
4 wounded 
24/July/2015 Germany Ansbach suicide 
bombing 
15 wounded 
24/July/2015 France  Rouen knife  1 killed (84 
years priest)  
22/March/2016 Brussels Brussels  Suicide 
bombings 
32 killed 
300 
wounded 
2/December/2015 USA San 
Bernardino 
shooting 14 killed 
21 wounded 
1/January/2017 Turkey Istanbul shooting 39 killed 
71 wounded 
Table 1: Number of lone wolf attacks against Western countries, weapons 
used and number of causalities.  
 
                                                          
35 Global Terrorism Index. “Measuring and Understanding.” 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 3
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss3/3
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As an illustration of the method of catalyzing lone wolf attacks, Figure 4 
shows a message broadcast by the Nashir channel, encouraging 
individuals to carry out what they call ‘do it yourself jihad’. The message 
provides ideas to encourage lone wolf attacks, including examples of easy 
to obtain weapons as well as methods of perpetrating terror attacks. 
 
 
Figure 4: Screenshot from ISIS Telegram channel, Nashir political 
services36. 
 
In a significant example of escalating targeting capabilities, the United 
Cyber Caliphate (UCC) Telegram channel broadcast a link to a ‘kill list’ file 
posted on Justpaste.it and addressed at lone wolves, containing the alleged 
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of a hundred US soldiers 
(Figure 5). The message uses two main hashtags, #kill Dogs and 
#Individual wolves, and reads: “we know all your citizens INFO, and we 
have all your personal data. And your systems have failed to protect the 
most of your data [sic]. We are watching you. And we will kill you37.”  
 
                                                          
36 Screenshot obtained from Nashir political service 23 May 2016 
37 As quoted in United Cyber Caliphate Telegram channel on 19 August 
2016 
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Figure 5: Screenshot obtained from UCC telegram channel38.  
 
The UCC channel has also previously broadcasted links to manuals and 
instructions on terror tactics and methods aimed at lone. Such messages 
are usually identified with the “lone wolves #get ready” hashtag in Arabic 
(Figure 6), and suggest terror tools for ‘do it yourself jihad’ including guns, 
cars, trucks, knives, etc.   
 
 
                                                          
38 Screenshot obtained from UNITED CYBER CALIPHATE on 19 August 
2016. 
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Figure 6: Screenshot obtained from UCC Telegram channel, titled: lone 
wolves #get ready3940. 
 
Additionally, prior to the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, ISIS-related 
Telegram channels encouraged individuals to adopt Munich-style attacks 
targeting Western athletes.41 The use of the #RioLW hashtag (LW refers to 
lone wolves) on ISIS-related Telegram channels (see Figure 7) were 
considered serious enough to force Brazilian authorities to mobilize extra 
200,000 military personnel to secure the Olympics.    
 
 
Figure 7: Screenshot obtained from SITE intelligence group discussing the 
#RioLW hashtag42. 
 
At any one point a number of visual messages aimed at potential lone 
wolves circulate across ISIS-related Telegram channels, with the clear 
purpose of inspiring further terrorist attacks (Figures 8 and 9).  
 
                                                          
 
40 Screenshot obtained from UNITED CYBER CALIPHATE on 19 August 
2016 
41 Referring to the 1972 PLO terrorist attack on Israeli athletes during the Munich 
Olympics. 
42 Screenshot obtained from SITR Twitter account posted on 5 August 
2016. 
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Figure 8: Screenshot from the Sham State Media Organization Telegram 
channel encouraging more attacks43. 
 
 
                                                          
43 Screenshot obtained from Sham State Media Organization Telegram 
channel on 11 August 2016 
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Figure 9: Screenshots from a propaganda video encouraging attacks, 
posted on the Barood Telegram channel44. 
 
Overall, the number of people killed by jihadi violence in Western Europe 
in 2014-2016 (273 people) is greater than the number in all previous years 
combined (267 people).45 This is due to a small number of highly deadly 
incidents, as shown in Figure 3. In the period of 2014 to 2016 alone, 42 
well-documented plots were registered (of the 42 plots, 38 were reported 
to be linked to ISIS), with 9 plots registered in 2014, 17 in 2015, and 16 in 
2016.  
 
Claiming responsibility for, and celebrating acts of terror 
In the aftermath of each individual attack on a Western target, pro-ISIS 
channels on Telegram are flooded with images and posts mass-produced 
by online collectives of e-jihadists celebrating these attacks by hijacking 
popular hashtags such as #NiceAttack, #Nice, #Brussels (Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10: Screenshot from ISIS Telegram channels celebrating lone wolf 
attacks46.  
 
The process of establishing responsibility for and celebrating in the 
aftermath of lone wolf acts of terror works fluidly and simultaneously 
encourage affiliates to celebrate the lone wolf across related Telegram 
channels. It also propagandizes the lone wolf pledge of allegiance, if there 
is one, across wider social media (Figures 11 and 12).  
                                                          
44 Screenshot obtained from Barood Telegram channel on 9 August 2016 
45 Nesser, Stenersen, and Oftedal, “Jihadi Terrorism,” 3-24. 
46 Screenshot obtained from ISIS affiliated channels on Telegram in the 
period between 21 July to 4 August 2016. 
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Figure 11: Amaq news agency claiming responsibility for lone wolf 
attacks.47 
 
Ironically, content disseminated by Amaq news agency is considered  
authentic and trustworthy by both international media outlets and ISIS 
sympathizers. Even so, Western-led efforts to degrade and suppress its 
social media presence have pushed Amaq into adopting Telegram as its 
primary platform. To date it appears that despite Telegram’s continuous 
attempts to take down the Amaq channel it keeps resurfacing with a large 
number of followers. The channel is important enough in the ISIS 
information warfare operations to feature lone wolf pledges of allegiance, 
filmed before or after major attacks (Figure 12). 
 
                                                          
47 Shane Harris, “This Is ISIS’s New Favorite App for Secret Messages,” accessed 
December 10, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/16/this-is-
isis-new-favorite-app-for-secret-messages.html. 
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Figure 12: Video of Wurzburg attacker Muhammad Riyad pledging 
allegiance to ISIS.48 
 
There appears to be substantial evidence that Telegram is used by ISIS as a 
propaganda platform inspiring individual jihadist to act against Western 
targets. To ascertain its role in context, it is important to analyze lone wolf 
attacks in the West before and after the emergence of ISIS.  
 
Analysis of Lone Wolf Attacks  
To date, there is little evidence proving that ISIS is directly coordinating 
terror plots against the West, even though the organization celebrates 
these attacks when they occur, and claiming responsibility post factum. On 
a conceptual level, Gartenstein-Ross has argued that the failure to identify 
direct ties between lone wolf attacks and ISIS is part of a broader and 
long-lasting pattern of underestimating the goals of jihadist networks in 
Western countries.49 In France, ISIS member Rachid Kassim has been 
linked to at least two plots that were initially believed to have been carried 
out by lone wolves with no oversight or direction from ISIS. He is also 
thought to have been the orchestrator of over half of the 17 total plots 
foiled by French authorities in 2016. Most of the planning was done 
through his Telegram channel ‘Sabre de Lumière’ (Sword of Light). In an 
analysis of 38 ISIS-linked plots and attacks in Europe between 2014 and 
October 2016, 19 (50 percent) were found to have involved online 
instruction from members of ISIS’ networks. By contrast, prior to the 
emergence of ISIS on Telegram, Global Terrorism Index indicates that in 
                                                          
48 Harris, “ISIS’s New Favorite App.” 
49 Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, “The Myth of Lone-Wolf Terrorism.” 
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2014 lone wolf attacks motivated by political extremism accounted for the 
majority of deaths, compared to Islamic fundamentalism which accounted 
for only 19% of total deaths (Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 13: Screenshot shows Islamic fundamentalism is not a major 
catalyst for lone wolf attacks in the west.50  
 
After the emergence of ISIS and its subsequent calls for individual attacks 
against Western interest, Islamic fundamentalism became the primary 
motivation for terror attacks in Western countries. The strategy was 
outlined by Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani, the spokesperson of ISIS, who is 
on record saying, “lone wolf attacks in the US and Europe were dearer to 
us than the biggest action by us in Iraq and Syria.”51 ISIS propaganda 
                                                          
50 Global Terrorism Index. “Measuring and Understanding.” 
51 Adam Withnall, “Isis Official Calls for 'Lone Wolf' Attacks in US and Europe 
during Ramadan,” Independent 2016, available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-official-calls-for-
lone-wolf-attacks-in-us-and-europe-during-ramadan-a7042296.html. 
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aimed at potential Muslim lone wolf attackers in the West have been 
systematically broadcast via social media available globally. As Gabriel 
Weimann noted, “In nature, wolves do not hunt alone: they hunt in packs. 
So, with the lone-wolf terrorists: there is a virtual pack, a social network, 
behind them. They may operate alone, but they are recruited, radicalized, 
taught, trained, and directed by others.”52 Even though so far the number 
of attacks that can be credited to lone wolves is less than 2% of overall 
terrorist activity in most countries, the problem is in the rapidly growing 
number of attacks and the tremendous difficulty in predicting and 
disrupting them.53  
 
Crucially, as we have argued above, this process maps onto the ongoing 
efforts aimed at degrading ISIS’ digital capabilities, as the primary 
achievement of these efforts has been to push ISIS information operations 
to Telegram. Consecutively, security agencies and terrorism researchers 
have started highlighting the role of Telegram as a catalyst for terrorist 
mobilization. In popular media, this is framed typically as a new a sinister 
discovery:  
 
The two men who are accused [sic] of killing a French priest on 
July 26 met on the service (Telegram), and the BBC reported that 
one of the attackers discussed his murder plan in a closed group 
there. So, it makes sense that French law enforcement would want 
to be seen as cracking down on possible terrorism plans on the 
app.54   
 
In the aftermath of ISIS’ shift to Telegram, there has been growing 
awareness in media and policy circles of the role played by encrypted 
communication technologies and the rise of lone wolf attacks in the West. 
In an October 2015 testimony before the House Homeland Security 
Committee, the then Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director James 
Comey stated that:  
 
ISIS has used ubiquitous social media to push into the United 
States, into the pockets, onto the mobile devices of troubled souls 
throughout our country in all 50 states with a twin message: come 
or kill, come or kill. Come to the so-called caliphate, live a life of 
glory, participate in the final battle between good and evil on God’s 
                                                          
52 Weimann, “Lone Wolves in Cyberspace,” 75-90. 
53 Spaaij, “The Enigma,” 854-870. 
54 Sara Morrison, “French Teen Charged with Planning Terrorist Attack on 
Telegram, Vocativ,” accessed November 18, 2016, 
http://www.vocativ.com/349564/french-teen-charged-with-planning-terrorist-
attack-on-telegram/. 
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side. Come to the caliphate, and if you can’t [sic] come, kill where 
you are.55  
 
Telegram is often seen as the primary driver behind the emergence of a 
new style of digital jihad because of its facilitation of encrypted 
communication between ISIS members and affiliates.56 There has been 
increasing awareness of the role of private Telegram channels in the 
facilitation of radicalization and coordination between ISIS members and 
potential lone wolf recruits.57 These types of channels act not only as one-
to-many propaganda outlets, but also as one-to-one and many-to-many 
coordination platforms. Importantly, the secure format of these 
communications makes it that much harder for security agencies to 
ascertain the coordination logistics of terror acts and disrupt potential 
attacks (Figure 14).  
 
For example, even though there is no evidence that Telegram was used to 
coordinate the Paris terrorist attacks, the attackers managed to coordinate 
and execute their plans while evading detection by counter-terrorism 
officials.58 ISIS propaganda has been quick to claim responsibility for lone 
wolf attacks while maintaining a propaganda image of overwhelming 
success (Figure 15).  
 
 
                                                          
55 Homeland Security Committee, “#Terror Gone Viral,” 1-15. 
56 Russon and Murdock, “Welcome to the Bizarre.” 
57 Victor Garcia, “At the Heart of Ansar at Tawhid, the "jihad channel" of 
Telegram and Kermiche,” L’Express, last modified 6/8/2016available at: 
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/ansar-at-tawhid-le-canal-djihad-de-
telegram-et-de-kermiche_1818983.html. 
58 Kavanaugh and Shiloach, “ISIS Spreads Violence.” 
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Figure 14: Coordination among ISIS network.59 
 
 
Figure 15: ISIS claiming successful attacks in Europe60. 
 
Discussion 
Most messages posted on Telegram by ISIS members and affiliates 
highlight the role of lone wolves in perpetrating terrorist attacks across 
Western countries. These posts work to both reinforce ISIS propaganda of 
success and positive momentum against the West, as well as catalyze and 
recruit new lone wolf attackers from among a multitude of ISIS 
sympathizers. Islamic State of Iraq and Sham members and affiliates 
acting as e-jihadists are using Telegram channels as logistical tools to 
support outreach to and communication with potential lone wolves. 
Logistical support extends from facilitating secure one-to-many and 
many-to-many communication channels, to producing and rapidly sharing 
visual propaganda in support of attacks, free distribution of hacked or 
sock-puppet Twitter accounts, and instructions to evade surveillance 
through the use of TOR/VPN. Specific logistics information for 
perpetrating lone wolf attacks includes tools, potential locations, tactics 
for target identification, and methods of concealment. Weimann has 
argued, “in fact, almost all of the lone-wolf cases in recent years have 
involved the use of electronic social media. For lone wolves, online 
communication provides the needed social bonding, a (virtual) community 
[sic] and a source of guidance, support [sic] and moral backing.”61  
 
                                                          
59 Roula Khalaf, “Why Everyone, Including the Jihadis of Isis, loves Telegram 
Messaging,” Financial Times, November 25, 2015, available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/86e9b154-8798-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896. 
60 Screenshot obtained from Nashir political service Telegram channel on 
23 August 2016. 
61 Weimann, “Lone Wolves in Cyberspace,” 75-90.  
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In addition, Telegram channels have provided ISIS with a safe media 
environment allowing it to communicate propaganda to a global 
multilingual audience. Key propaganda messages are disseminated in 
Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, German, Turkish, and Spanish 
making it much harder to disrupt ISIS’ information operations. In effect, 
Telegram acts as an open source marketplace of communication between 
leading figures of the terrorist organization and a multitude of globally 
distributed affiliates and sympathizers. This is consistent with 
Gartenstein-Ross’ conclusion that encrypted social media apps such as 
Telegram have allowed ISIS to build cohesive and intimate online 
communities facilitating rapid radicalization.62  
 
It is important to note that, while ISIS and its affiliates effectively 
leveraged Telegram, the terrorist organization failed to establish and 
maintain a wide media presence across popular social media platforms. 
Islamic State of Iraq and Sham-affiliated Telegram channels constantly 
encourage followers to reopen suspended Twitter accounts, demonstrating 
that the organization still sees Telegram as a poor substitute for the global 
public platform of Twitter. The specific architecture of Telegram has 
forced ISIS to use it as a semi-closed coordination and initial media 
generation network. This network involves:  1) Islamic State of Iraq and 
Sham fighters uploading information and receiving updates from battles 
in real time, 2) Islamic State of Iraq and Sham affiliates or sympathizers 
sharing news and updates, 3) anti-ISIS actors (Intelligence agencies, 
hackers), and 4) researchers and journalists.   
 
Although direct links between ISIS and individual lone wolves are hard to 
substantiate, studies have found a link between lone wolf attacks in the 
West and specific calls from ISIS preceding them.63 That said, the nature 
of lone wolf attacks necessities a case-by-case study of each incident. Lone 
wolf attacks may be motivated by a combination of beliefs, personal 
vendettas, religious, or political objections. Moreover, the emergence of 
ISIS-related “virtual entrepreneurs” has injected additional network 
complexity into what were traditionally seen as radicalized lone wolves 
attacking Western targets.64 For example, ISIS-related virtual 
entrepreneurs have been involved in assisting with travel logistics 
therefore acting as connecting hubs between fully distributed lone wolves 
operating in target countries. This development has made it much easier 
to motivate and inspire individuals who are ready to perpetrate terrorist 
attacks.  
 
                                                          
62 Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, “The Myth of Lone-Wolf Terrorism. 
63 Spaaij, “The Enigma,” 854-870. 
64 Meleagrou-Hitchens and Hughes, “The Threat to the United States.” 
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Conclusion 
This study represents the first step in understanding the role of encrypted 
social media in enabling lone wolf attacks. We have illustrated how ISIS 
affiliates utilize Telegram, and the reasons behind the organization’s 
digital migration. Although ISIS has effectively leveraged the features of 
Telegram, the organization always asks its followers to harness other 
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. Throughout our study, ISIS’ 
Telegram channels were persistently vulnerable to suspension by 
Telegram administrators. Popular channels such as Dabiq, Amaq, and 
Nashir have been suspended hundreds of times, dramatically reducing 
their audience. Furthermore, anti-ISIS actors have also migrated to 
Telegram, countering its propaganda and reporting channels for 
suspension. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that ISIS has harnessed 
Telegram’s features to encourage, coordinate where possible, and 
propagandize lone wolf attacks against Western countries, as well as 
maintain its global network of terrorist information operations. 
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